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143 
ME THE PEOPLE 
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING 
THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE 
PEOPLE. By Randy E. Barnett.1 New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers. 2016. Pp. xiv + 283. $26.99 (cloth). 
Jason Mazzone2 
INTRODUCTION 
Randy Barnett begins Our Republican Constitution3 with a 
story of “triumph and tragedy”4 in the Supreme Court case of 
NFIB v. Sebelius.5 The triumph: five justices agreed that the 
minimum essential coverage provision of the Affordable Care Act 
exceeded Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause; thus, 
however broadly Congress might regulate interstate commerce, it 
cannot impose economic mandates.6 The tragedy: five also agreed 
that Congress’s taxing power supported the statutory provision. 
“Although we had saved the enumerated powers scheme of the 
Constitution for the country,” Barnett concludes, “we had lost our 
fight to save the country from Obamacare” (p. 14). 
The account reveals a good deal about the potential of and 
limits to Barnett’s project. In a nutshell, Barnett views courts as 
simultaneously dangerous to and essential for “securing the 
liberty and sovereignty of we the people.” On the one hand, 
Barnett complains, judicial decisions produced the consolidation 
 
 1.  Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory; Director, Georgetown Center 
for the Constitution. 
 2. Professor of Law & Lynn H. Murray Faculty Scholar in Law, University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign. For helpful comments I am grateful to symposium participants and 
to Joseph Blocher.  
 3. RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE 
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016). 
 4. See ch. 1. 
 5. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (upholding 
minimum essential coverage provisions of Affordable Care Act as proper exercise of 
Congress’s taxing powers). 
 6. P. 11 (“This was huge.”). 
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of governmental power and the truncated rights that Barnett 
laments. On the other hand, fixing the problem requires highly 
motivated judges to keep power in check and promote rights. 
These two impulses are in tension and, at least without additional 
work on both the diagnostic and remedial sides, appear 
incompatible. The root of the tension is Barnett’s failure to 
perceive the limits to judicial recognition of constitutional rights 
when judicial power itself is consolidated. Thus, in celebrating 
state authority to adopt different regulatory programs and the 
benefits of citizen foot-voting in response, Barnett writes that 
such “experimentation is impossible at the national level when 
adopting a one-size-fits-all regulatory scheme” (p. 176). Yet 
Barnett does not extend the same analysis to the courts, where a 
one-size-fits-all judicial scheme is equally problematic for 
Barnett’s constitutional vision. Consolidated judicial power—
where ultimate authority rests in the Supreme Court of the United 
States—does not serve well to generate expansive rights for “We 
the People.”7 It is even less suited to Barnett’s own individualistic 
version of rights—a sort of “Me the People”—in which each of us 
is sovereign and courts exist to vindicate our personal liberties.8 
Part I of this essay briefly describes Barnett’s account of 
constitutional structure, individual rights and the role of courts. 
Part II sets out why consolidation of judicial power stands as an 
impediment to the version of government authority and 
individual rights Barnett advocates. Part III discusses aspects of 
the jurisprudential approaches of Justices John Paul Stevens and 
Sonia Sotomayor that, perhaps surprisingly, point to a role for 
courts that would better promote experimentation and protect 
more securely individual rights along the lines Barnett advocates. 
The conclusion extends the analysis to suggest some broader 
lessons about Barnett’s work and the structure of courts—and the 
implications for Our Constitution. 
I. STRUCTURE, RIGHTS, COURTS 
In Barnett’s description, the Constitution of the United 
States is “primarily a structure that was intended to protect the 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 8. See, e.g., pp. 22–23 (describing how sovereignty resides in “We the People” not 
as a collective entity but a set of individuals and stating that the role of government 
representatives is not to carry out the will of the majority but to “secure the preexisting 
rights of We the People, each and every one of us.”). 
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individual sovereignty of the people” and “[o]nly secondarily, and 
incompletely, does it protect any particular individual rights 
retained by the people” (pp. 167-168). Barnett contends that 
federalism ensures that most laws that affect liberties will be made 
at the state level where individuals are empowered by foot-voting 
such that “subnational competition” with respect to economic and 
social policies “imposes a salutary constraint on state 
governments by threatening an exodus of dissenting citizens to 
other states.” (pp. 173, 177, 179). Separation of powers also serves 
to “secure the sovereignty of the people” by keeping the executive 
branch in check (though legislators tend to shift power and 
responsibility to the executive and so the checking role is not 
necessarily robust) (pp. 204-205). 
For Barnett, structural constraints depend upon on courts 
policing the contours of power; the whole scheme collapses if 
courts abandon this key role. Most importantly, federalism only 
works to protect liberties if courts “hold Congress to its 
enumerated powers” (p. 188). Alas, in the modern age “judicial 
abdication” has undermined federalism constraints and the result 
is a runaway national government whose excesses undermine 
individual liberty. Barnett reports that, notwithstanding some 
isolated bright spots and the “partial revival” of federalism under 
the Rehnquist Court, from the time of the New Deal the courts 
have mostly given Congress “free rein to regulate or prohibit 
every economic activity in the country” (pp. 189-202). The cost 
has been an erosion of state autonomy. Courts have also failed to 
halt the growth of executive power as evidenced by the rise of the 
legislature-enabled modern administrative state, a development 
with “dangerous” consequences for the sovereignty and rights of 
the people (pp. 204-205). 
As for constitutional rights, Barnett says they are merely 
emergency “lifeboats” for when “the constitutional structure 
proves inadequate” (p. 168). In the post-New Deal era, however, 
the courts, responsible for launching the lifeboats and saving us 
from the sinking structure, have also failed to perform their rights-
protecting role. In deferring to federal and state power, courts 
have wrongly “honor[ed] the will of the people, as expressed by a 
majority of a handful of ‘legislators,’” rather than doing what they 
should be doing: “securing the rights of the people, each and every 
one” (pp. 126-127, emphasis omitted). Wrong-headed theories of 
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Thayerian deference9 and of counter-majoritarian difficulties10 
have left courts frozen, unable to “protect . . . rights from being 
unreasonably restricted by the majority” (p. 162). As with 
federalism, though, it isn’t all doom and gloom. On occasion, 
courts have risen to the task of safeguarding liberties from the 
“majoritarian difficulty” of popular will. Brown v. Board of 
Education,11 for example, represents “a redemption of the 
Republican Constitution” in Barnett’s view (p. 160). 
Barnett offers a series of solutions for restoring his 
Republican Constitution. Most of his stock is placed in “an 
impartial judiciary” (the subject of the book’s final chapter). 
Courts, Barnett says, will play “a vital role” on the remedial side. 
By courts, Barnett means the federal courts12 and in particular the 
U.S. Supreme Court.13 At the outset, only courts can protect 
structure. “Obtaining the benefits of federalism requires federal 
courts to develop doctrines that identify the outer limits of 
Congress’ enumerated powers” (p. 224). Likewise, “the Court 
must overcome its reluctance to enforce the separation of powers 
within the federal government—a reticence that has undermined 
the rights of the sovereign people by allowing the rise of an 
executive-administrative state with the prerogative powers of a 
sovereign king” (p. 257). While in the bleak alternative world of 
the “Democratic Constitution” courts defer to popular majorities 
and exercise judicial review with restraint, the Republican 
Constitution has “a completely different picture of judges” (p. 
24). Judges themselves are the “servants of the people” with the 
“primary duty” of keeping government power in check so as to 
protect individual rights. And rights are “best protected” by 
“judicially enforcing the structural constraints on federal power, 
including the separation of powers and the limits on the powers 
of Congress” (pp. 111-112). When courts step up, the republic is 
saved. 
 
 9. Id. at 128; see James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).  
 10. P. 162; see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2nd ed. 1986). 
 11. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding racial segregation in 
public schools unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause). 
 12. P. 224 (“Obtaining the benefits of federalism requires federal courts to develop 
doctrines that identify the outer limits of Congress’s enumerated powers.”). 
 13. See, e.g., id. at 257 (“Every justice appointed to the Supreme Court must publicly 
commit to the principle that judges have no power to amend or modify the Constitution of 
the United States by ‘interpretation.’”). 
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While structure, reinforced by judicial decisions, offers the 
best safeguard for rights, Barnett recognizes that structural 
safeguards might themselves fail: when they do, down we shinny 
to the lifeboats. But these are no ordinary lifeboats whose 
passengers huddle until rescue arrives. Instead, courts play an 
aggressive role in protecting rights directly. With respect to that 
aspect of the republican constitution, Barnett wastes no time on 
the humdrums of “freedom of speech,”14 “unreasonable searches 
and seizures,”15 or “cruel and unusual punishments.”16 Instead, 
courts exist to evaluate all laws—federal, state, local—for 
compliance with due process. Barnett thus trumpets the approach 
of (certain) pre-New Deal Justices who “viewed the Due Process 
Clause[s] as providing a procedure by which a person . . . may 
challenge a[ny] law as outside the ‘just powers’ of Congress or 
state legislators to enact” (p. 227). As such, he says, “before a 
sovereign individual can justly be deprived of his or her ‘life’ (by 
capital punishment), ‘liberty’ (by imprisonment), or ‘property’ 
(by penalty or fine), the ‘due process of law’ requires a judicial 
evaluation of whether a statute is within the power of Congress or 
state legislatures to enact” (p. 227). In particular, courts keep a 
check on “irrational and arbitrary laws,” which, in Barnett’s view, 
are not really laws at all and thus invalid. He explains that 
“[a]lthough the sovereign people can consent to be governed, 
when their consent is not expressed but implied they cannot be 
presumed or supposed to have consented to a regime in which a 
legislature can act irrationally or arbitrarily” (p. 228). Thus “the 
process of applying a law to a particular person includes a fair 
opportunity to contest whether a statute (or administrative 
regulation) is within the ‘proper’ or ‘just power’ of a legislature to 
enact and therefore carries the obligation of a law” (p. 228, 
emphasis omitted). Because “an irrational or arbitrary statute is 
not within the just powers of a republican legislature,” courts must 
strike it down (p. 228). 
Here, though, some chickens come home to roost. Barnett 
complains about consolidated federal power: congressional power 
displacing state power; federal executive power displacing 
legislative power. But the consolidation account can easily be 
extended also to the third branch. And recognizing the 
 
 14. U.S. CONT. amend. I. 
 15. Id. amend. IV. 
 16. Id. amend. VIII. 
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consolidation of judicial power casts serious doubt on the 
potential of the Supreme Court to play the vigorous rights-
enforcing role Barnett imagines. The next Part takes up that 
problem. 
II. CONSOLIDATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 
Like most of us, Barnett takes for granted that in our 
constitutional system there is necessarily a single court at the top 
that is supreme and every other court has to fall in line with its 
decisions on questions of federal law, including the scope of 
federal constitutional rights. The arrangement might easily seem 
obvious and desirable: it means that federal constitutional law is 
uniform around the country, that you don’t have more federal 
rights because you live in Massachusetts rather than in Alabama, 
or that constitutional protections expand and compress on 
interstate road trips. 
However, this sort of complete power at the top of a judicial 
pyramid is actually a relatively recent development. Only in the 
twentieth century did the Supreme Court acquire statutory power 
that allowed it to have ultimate constitutional authority in the 
modern sense—to produce the kind of uniformity that we today 
take for granted. Before the extension of statutory authority in 
the twentieth century, indeed beginning with the 1789 Judiciary 
Act, the Supreme Court did not play that sort of role. Under the 
1789 Act, the Supreme Court lacked power to review state court 
decisions holding that state government had violated the federal 
Constitution: the Supreme Court could only review state court 
decisions that rejected a federal constitutional claim against state 
government.17 As a result, state court decisions that went further 
than would the Supreme Court in recognizing federal 
constitutional rights against state government were immune from 
review. Consistency around the country wasn’t seen as a 
particularly important virtue and the jurisdictional limits on 
Supreme Court review allowed the state courts to ratchet up 
federal constitutional rights when they reviewed claims against 
state government.18 Only in 1914 did Congress authorize the 
 
 17. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80–81.  
 18. See Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
1 (2007) (describing early state court applications of the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
against state government).  
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Supreme Court to review state court decisions upholding federal 
constitutional claims against state government—thus providing 
for a checking function in both directions.19 Today’s system in 
which the Supreme Court has complete authority on the meaning 
of the federal Constitution and the power to correct any contrary 
decisions of the state courts (as well as the lower federal courts) is 
a change from historical practices. 
A. CONSOLIDATION AND INDIVIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY 
For Barnett’s project, the consolidation of judicial power 
presents a problem. There are costs in consolidating authority at 
the top and deeming that at the local level courts may not do 
something different, do something that is not authorized by the 
Supreme Court. Lodging authority over the meaning of federal 
constitutional rights in a single court that sits in Washington, D.C., 
has a significant curtailing effect upon the scope of judicially-
recognized rights. In settling constitutional rights for the entire 
nation, the Supreme Court proceeds with caution. The Court is 
rarely ahead of political change and within the range of results 
they find satisfactory, Justices across the spectrum tend to opt for 
narrow rather than broad outcomes. The Justices understand that 
they are setting rules for a diverse nation, that those rules impose 
costs on state and local government, and that it is normally better 
to postpone deciding more than is necessary to dispose of the case 
at hand. Examples are everywhere. Here is one: the Court has 
held, in Gideon v. Wainwright, that in serious criminal cases the 
Sixth Amendment requires that the state provide an indigent 
defendant with a lawyer.20 However, that right is quite modest: 
there is no guarantee that the state-supplied lawyer be 
particularly good and few defendants succeed in making out a 
case that in practice the quality of counsel rendered the right 
ineffective. 21 
 
 19. Act of Dec. 23, 1914, Pub. L. No. 224, 38 Stat. 790. 
 20. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 346 (1963). 
 21. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that in order to 
demonstrate counsel was constitutionally defective a convicted defendant must 
demonstrate (1) that “counsel’s performance was deficient . . . [by] showing that counsel 
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) that “the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense . . . by showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable”). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from 
Gideon, 122 YALE L. J. 2676, 2685 (2013) (attributing the “failure” of Gideon to the Court 
“impos[ing] an unfunded mandate on state and local governments with the only realistic 
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Put differently, it is difficult for the Supreme Court to tailor 
a rights-protecting rule to the worst offender state or locality 
because other states and localities will also bear whatever 
enforcement burden results. Even though the Court might be 
outraged by the practices of a particular police department or the 
conditions of a particular school district or (to take something 
Barnett focuses heavily on) state law hurdles to practice a trade,22 
the Court must resist the temptation to generate from the 
particular case a requirement that will have effects everywhere. 
The Supreme Court, then, responsible for setting rules for the 
entire system, is predisposed to going small rather than big. 
None of this bodes well for Barnett’s remedial program. In 
describing how courts should protect rights, Barnett’s Exhibit A 
is the lower court’s opinion in Lee Optical,23 which Barnett deems 
“a marvelous example of how impartial judges can critically assess 
whether a statute is truly justified as a health and safety measure” 
(p. 236). While Barnett thinks that the (lower) court went astray 
in presuming the constitutionality of the state law regulating the 
eye care business at issue, the court nonetheless properly 
demanded “a reasonable relation” between the statute’s 
restrictions on the practices of opticians and the public health 
“purpose” behind those restrictions. Finding no such relationship 
(and suggesting the law was actually motivated by economic 
protectionism) the court, in Barnett’s view, appropriately 
invalidated the statute as “arbitrary” (pp. 236-239). Barnett 
cheers the court’s scrutiny of the means-end fit and its immediate 
focus on “rationality” rather than taking the usual judicial route 
of “identifying and defining the precise right being infringed” (p. 
240). He explains: 
Note that the panel spent no time discussing the origin, scope, 
or fundamentality of the right at issue, as modern “substantive 
due process” doctrine requires. Indeed, the court never 
specifically identified the right in question other than a passing 
reference to “a long recognized trade” and its characterization 
 
enforcement mechanism being the finding of ineffective assistance of counsel in individual 
cases” but Strickland “make[ing] it very difficult for a convicted individual to obtain relief, 
even when counsel’s performance is quite deficient.”). 
 22. See, e.g., pp. 222–23 (discussing economic liberty). 
 23. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 490–91 (1955) (reviewing and upholding 
as rational state regulations governing fitting and selling of prescription eyeglasses, on a 
challenge brought by opticians).  
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of the “skills and business” of the optician as a “valuable 
property right” (p. 240). 
That approach was merited, Barnett says, because 
“[a]nalyzing the right does none of the work in assessing the 
rationality of the restriction” (p. 240). In other words—and here 
we come to the core of Barnett’s envisaged approach—any 
restriction on behavior is ripe for a due process challenge. Further 
(and consistent with Barnett’s notion of equal rights), the lower 
court did not “need to identify opticians as a ‘suspect class’ 
deserving of enhanced protection” because “under the Due 
Process Clause it was enough that they were ‘persons’” entitled to 
challenge the law. In sum, there is no need to worry about who is 
asserting a right or what the right even is: laws that a court decides 
are irrational violate due process. 
The trouble with all of this (the bravura of the Lee Optical 
panel aside) is that courts are orderly institutions, often rigidly so. 
Judges like to know the job they are to perform and the rules 
under which they are to perform it. Barnett’s approach requires 
courts to venture out on some thin and swaying limbs. In 
conducting its due process evaluation, Barnett posits that a judge 
should not even presume legitimate legislative authority because 
the proper starting point is judicial skepticism towards all laws 
(pp. 228-229). This is no mere theory of federal enumeration. In 
Barnett’s approach, skepticism that power even exists extends 
also to state laws: while the Constitution limits Congress to its 
enumerated powers, a due process analysis presumes limits on 
state power: thus there must be “an assessment by an impartial 
judiciary that a particular statute was indeed a law within the 
powers that a people may be presumed to have delegated to their 
agents in state legislatures” (p. 230). But that is just the starting 
point. Even if a court concludes that some restriction on life, 
liberty, or property is indeed within the “‘just powers’ of a 
republican government in a free society,” the judge must also 
decide whether “the restriction . . . is necessary to serve” the 
lawful purpose (p. 231). An inquiry of that nature roots out laws 
with improper motives such as favoritism or a desire to stigmatize 
individuals or whittle away at rights. As courts perform their 
roving inspections, the burden to establish that a law is actually 
valid belongs to the government: “Requiring the government to 
identify its true purpose and then show that the means chosen are 
actually well suited to advance that purpose helps to smoke out 
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illicit motives that the government is never presumed by a 
sovereign people to have authorized” (p. 232). Further, in the 
course of judicial review, “it is ‘the people’ as individuals who, as 
sovereign, merit the benefit of the doubt when challenging the 
acts of their servants or agents” (p. 244). 
Barnett argues that the Republican Constitution will be 
saved if our Supreme Court (which, alas, reversed the lower court 
decision in Lee Optical) aggressively reviews laws and 
government action for their rationality. Yet once judicial 
authority to determine the scope of rights is pushed up to the 
top—to the level of the Supreme Court—the mechanisms of 
review slow down and seize up. With respect to the sort of claims 
made in Lee Optical, for instance, the Supreme Court is in a poor 
position to announce, in the name of due process, a right that 
tracks the claims of the opticians of a particular state and, 
following a close review of facts and of the arguments offered on 
both sides, invalidate as irrational the specific state-level 
regulations at issue—while at the same time saying nothing 
broader about whether a different state’s laws regulating opticians 
or other professionals are valid or not. The rare lower court 
untroubled by the broader impact of a ruling and not concerned 
about being reversed on appeal might be inclined to perform the 
sort of review Barnett imagines. But once the case moves up to 
the Supreme Court—or Supreme Court doctrine moves down to 
limit what the lower court can even do—the stakes change and so 
does the scope of possible outcomes. In sum, while Barnett 
complains that “experimentation is impossible at the national 
level when adopting a one-size-fits-all regulatory scheme,” he fails 
to acknowledge the impact of one-size rights that result when 
judicial authority is lodged at the top (p. 176). In Barnett’s vision, 
“each person [is afforded] the opportunity to contest a 
deprivation of their life, liberty, or property as irrational or 
arbitrary” (p. 245). But a consolidated system of judicial 
authority—in which once a decision is reached it applies 
everywhere—does not easily facilitate a challenge by and ruling 
tailored to the single rights-bearing citizen. 
B. RIGHTS UNDEFINED 
Worse still, Barnett’s whole vision of rights runs headlong 
into the modern system of consolidated judicial power. While the 
Supreme Court rules with an eye to the nation as a whole, Barnett 
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sees rights in radically individualistic terms. Thus, he says, 
sovereignty resides in “We the People” not as a collective entity 
but only in the sense that the “We” comprises a set of individuals. 
Government representatives, on this account, do not serve to 
carry out the will of the majority but to “secure the preexisting 
rights of We the People, each and every one of us” (p. 23). The 
“people” who retain rights under the Ninth Amendment and to 
whom powers are reserved in the Tenth are thus actually 
“individuals, each and every one” (p. 65). 
However energizing Barnett’s individualism might at first 
seem, it quickly gives one pause. How, after all, would we go 
about identifying and cataloging the liberty interests of 
324,682,914 (and counting) Americans?24 Barnett himself seems 
to recognize the dilemma. Thus instead of identifying rights that 
merit protection, Barnett urges “shifting the question” to whether 
government power is justly-exercised (p. 255). Accordingly, while 
modern due process doctrine “empowers judges to selectively 
identify ‘fundamental rights’ . . . deserving of special protection,” 
Barnett’s “traditional approach” would “protect[] all rightful 
exercises of liberty by everyone alike by examining the rationality 
and arbitrariness of a restriction on liberty” (p. 244). Everything, 
then, is up for challenge by everyone. There is no need to settle on 
a list of protected rights. And if that seems unsatisfactory, rights 
equality is an alternative approach. In one place, for instance, 
Barnett says the only valid government restriction of rights is to 
promote more equal rights: “[L]iberties of the individual may be 
regulated by law. But the proper purpose of such regulation must 
be limited to the equal protection of the rights of each and every 
person” (p. 25). 
Nonetheless, Barnett also appears to recognize (quite 
rightly) that judges, orderly creatures, almost certainly will insist 
on knowing which right they are being asked to protect. Barnett’s 
book thus lurches between a freewheeling due process 
approach—in which the components of liberty never need 
specification—and advocacy of more particularized rights. 
Thus, on the one hand, while modern due process doctrine 
stingily “empowers judges to selectively identify ‘fundamental 
rights’ . . . deserving of special protection,” Barnett says his 
 
 24. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
popclock (last visited Oct. 11, 2016, 10:42 AM EST).  
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“traditional approach” would “protect[] all rightful exercises of 
liberty by everyone alike by examining the rationality and 
arbitrariness of a restriction on liberty” (p. 244). On the other 
hand, Barnett insists that “[a] Due Process challenge . . . arises 
only if a government is restricting the life, liberty, or property of 
an individual” and “when a government action is not depriving a 
person of any of these, he or she cannot object to that law in court, 
but must confine such objections to the political process” (pp. 230-
231). Yet that approach requires putting some meat on the bone. 
In so doing, however, Barnett describes “liberty” itself so broadly 
that any law that prevents or penalizes somebody from doing 
something seems open to a due process challenge. For example, 
in Barnett’s account, restrictions on commercial flower arranging, 
massage therapy, hair braiding, interior design, and embalming 
the dead all implicate liberty interests (pp. 232-233). Barnett gives 
just one example of a law not subject to liberty-based review by 
one of his Me the People: “the hours the postal service sets for its 
operation or myriad other regulations of government entities” (p. 
231). (And yet, one wonders: why not? Surely there is somebody 
out there whose ability to arrange flowers, massage the sore, braid 
hair, design interiors, or embalm the dead requires off-hours 
access to the post office.) 
In other parts of the book, liberty takes on more concrete 
form. Barnett invokes the “rights . . . retained by the people” in 
the Ninth Amendment and the “privileges or immunities of 
citizens” in the Fourteenth Amendments as a useful basis for 
identifying “just what rights and powers, privileges and 
immunities are retained by the sovereign people as individuals” 
(p. 24, omission in original). Barnett also invokes natural rights as 
a source of specificity: he says “universally accepted at the time of 
the founding was that each person needs a ‘space’ over which he 
or she has sole jurisdiction or liberty to act and within which no 
one else may rightfully enter” and that this space or liberty 
represented “natural rights” (p. 49, emphasis omitted). Indeed, 
Barnett reasons that natural rights correspond to the rights 
retained by the people under the Ninth Amendment. Another 
effort to pin down protected rights comes with the opening 
statements of the book that the rights and powers of individuals 
“closely resemble those enjoyed by sovereign monarchs” (p. 24). 
Here, Barnett identifies four things that should count: (1) 
“individual citizens have jurisdiction over their private property”; 
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(2) “no citizen may interfere with the person and property of any 
other”; (3) “individual citizens [may] use force in defense of 
themselves and their possessions”; and (4) “individual citizens 
[may] freely . . . enter[] into contracts with each other” (pp. 24-
25). Besides the fact that the analogy to monarchs seems 
misplaced—monarchs enjoy absolute power (or at least seek 
to)—this catalog of four does not actually tell us much about the 
true scope of rights or the permissible range of government 
authority. Only (1) and (4), involving property and contract rights, 
arguably can be asserted against the government. As for (2) and 
(3), unless Barnett aims to resurrect long-abandoned arguments 
for positive constitutional rights, these two only become relevant 
to government action if the government punishes the defense of 
self and property. 
Neither a freewheeling due process approach nor vaguely-
articulated rights is likely to spur the kind of aggressive judicial 
interventions Barnett’s project requires. A judicial system in 
which ultimately power to adjudicate rights claims is lodged at the 
top of the pyramid cannot advance with any reliability the 
individualistic notion of rights Barnett offers. The system is not 
designed to respond to individual lawsuits grounded in 
unspecified notions of liberty that are triggered whenever the 
government restricts behavior. Nor are we likely to see slews of 
laws invalidated to protect the monarchical interests of 
individuals. 
Even Barnett himself appears to lack confidence in the 
capacity of the courts to promote his version of republican 
constitutionalism.25 Indeed, despite the rousing notions of liberty 
that pervade the book, in places the rights program sounds 
exceedingly modest. Barnett says, for example, that states and 
localities actually have tremendous leeway to pursue their own 
desired economic and social policies: “[S]o long as they remain 
 
 25. Barnett seems to recognize that judges (whose past decisions “have crippled our 
Republican Constitution” and “gutted the enumerated power scheme, the separation of 
powers, and the textual safeguards for abuse of federal and state legislative power”) are 
not naturally predisposed to playing the role he would like to assign to them. Thus while 
we need “an independent, engaged judiciary to ensure that the structural constraints of 
our Republican Constitution are honored,” and judges who follow originalism, “even a 
judiciary committed to republican principles is not enough.” Pp. 249, 254, 257. Also 
essential are steps to stem the past damage done by judges and adopt, through 
constitutional amendment, a series of new “structural constraints” (Barnett has a list of 
ten) “that do not require judicial enforcement to operate effectively.” Id. at 257. 
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within the proper scope of their power to protect the rights, 
health, and safety of the public, fifty states can experiment with 
different regimes of legal regulation” (p. 175). But that 
presupposes that the sovereign individuals—empowered to 
challenge virtually any law—will most of the time lose in court on 
their liberty claims. If—as in the lower court in Lee Optical—
litigants can regularly knock out regulations, there won’t be much 
space for legislative innovation and experimentation. Unless all 
that Barnett offers is a day in court—the chance to be heard but 
rarely to succeed—judicial review would undermine the fifty-state 
legislative experiment. 
C. HELLER & MCDONALD 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in District of Columbia v. 
Heller26 and McDonald v. Chicago27 amply illustrate the 
challenges of consolidated judicial power for Barnett’s project. 
While cheered by guns-rights advocates, Heller and McDonald 
were exceedingly modest rulings. The Court did indeed recognize 
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right separate 
from any participation in the militia. But the Court’s conception 
of that right was as narrow as it could possibly have been and 
deemed subject to so many exceptions to leave plenty of room for 
government regulation.28 The cases served We the People not Me 
the People: The Court’s narrow conception of the individual right 
at issue (to possess an operable handgun for self-defense) tracked 
very closely the views of the majority of the American population 
on the desirable scope of gun rights. Indeed, Heller and 
McDonald have had very little practical impact. They invalidated 
gun laws that, as measured by the rest of the nation, were extreme 
outliers: a total ban in the District of Columbia and Chicago 
respectively. The Court thus brought those jurisdictions in line 
with the democratic preferences of the country as a whole. We do 
 
 26. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (holding that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right to possess an operable handgun at home for 
purposes of self-defense). 
 27. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (holding that the Second 
Amendment right recognized in Heller applies to the states).  
 28. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools 
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.); id. at 627 (limiting protected weapons to those “in common use” 
so as to exclude “dangerous and unusual weapons”).  
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not know, of course, how far the Court in the future will extend 
the right recognized in Heller and McDonald. But if the five 
justices in the majority in those cases were seeking to prevent We 
the People from adopting, through democratic measures, gun 
regulations, they have thus far failed in a spectacular fashion. 
Lower federal and state courts have rejected virtually all of the 
Second Amendment challenges brought since Heller and 
McDonald.29 And the exceptions reinforce rather than disrupt the 
overall pattern. For example, in 2012, in Moore v. Madigan,30 a 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held 
that the Second Amendment protects also some right to carry a 
firearm in public.31 Again, though, the Illinois law at issue in that 
case—a near-total ban—was uniquely an outlier as measured by 
the rest of the nation.32 The Seventh Circuit panel also stayed its 
mandate to give the state legislature the opportunity “to craft a 
new gun law that will impose reasonable limitations, consistent 
with the public safety and the Second Amendment as interpreted 
in this opinion, on the carrying of guns in public.”33 This, too, was 
hardly a case of preventing democratic bodies from regulating, as 
shown by the myriad restrictions that the Illinois legislature 
subsequently imposed when, in order to comply with the circuit 
court’s judgment, it authorized concealed carrying.34 
There is likewise little muscle in Barnett’s invocation of the 
federalism decision of United States v. Lopez35 as serving Second 
 
 29. See, e.g., Hamblen v. United States, 591 F.3d 471, 474 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that Heller does not extend to machine guns because “the Second Amendment does not 
protect weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 
2009) (affirming the constitutionality of a federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2814 (2009); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 
474-75 (4th Cir. 2011) (rejecting Second Amendment argument and affirming conviction 
for carrying or possessing a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle within a national park area); 
United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 682 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding that 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits unlawful drug users from possessing guns, is 
constitutional); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682-83 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
domestic violence misdemeanants do not have a Second Amendment right to possess a 
handgun in their homes).  
 30. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 31. Id. at 941–42. 
 32. See id. at 940 (“Remarkably, Illinois is the only state that maintains a flat ban on 
carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home.”). 
 33. Id. at 942. 
 34.  Firearm Concealed Carry Act, 2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 98-63 (West) (codified 
as amended at 430 Ill. Comp. Stat. 66 (2013)). 
 35. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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Amendment goals. Barnett writes that “by striking down the 
Gun-Free School Zone Act . . . as beyond the power of Congress 
to enact, the Court protected the right of the people to keep and 
bear arms, but did so without having to apply the specific 
prohibition of the Second Amendment” (p. 200). Any such 
protection, though, was short lived.36 Congress reenacted the law 
invalidated in Lopez with a jurisdictional hook such that any 
Second Amendment benefit to Lopez evaporated.37 
Indeed, the ultimate impact of Heller and McDonald may be 
to enhance rather than constrain democracy. In recognizing an 
individual Second Amendment right, the Supreme Court 
provided a framework that could well facilitate future restrictions 
on guns. This is because the slippery slope argument long 
championed by the NRA—that if the government takes some 
guns it will take all guns—no longer has any force.38 Heller and 
McDonald set limits: limits facilitate as well as constrain 
legislative and executive action.  
D. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE COURTS 
Barnett says surprisingly little about state constitutions and 
state courts. They deserve some mention in the story. A state 
court can recognize broader rights under its own state constitution 
than the Supreme Court is willing to recognize as a matter of 
federal constitutional law. And because the state’s highest court 
is authoritative on the meaning of the state constitution, those 
rulings (so long as they really are just state-law based) are not 
subject to reversal by the U.S. Supreme Court. State courts, using 
state law, would thus seem positioned to beef up protections for 
liberty. 
State constitutional law, however, is also a casualty of the 
modern trend of consolidation of judicial power. Requiring the 
 
 36. For an alternative account of Lopez and other federalism decisions of the 
Rehnquist Court, see Jason Mazzone & Carl Emery Woock, Federalism as Docket Control, 
84 N.C. L. REV. 7 (2015). 
 37. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1998) (prohibiting in a school zone 
possession of a firearm “that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign 
commerce”).  
 38. See Akhil Reed Amar, When Legal Bullets Bounce Back, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Dec. 26, 2012, 4:30 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/legal-bullets-bounce-
back-article-1.1225737 (“After the rulings, this slippery slope argument no longer works. 
Precisely because the court has declared total confiscation off limits, there’s no legitimate 
fear that reasonable regulation will slide into tyrannical confiscation.”). 
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state courts to enforce federal constitutional provisions as defined 
and policed by the Supreme Court has left state constitutional law 
in the modern era relatively undeveloped. Rather than decide 
independently what provisions of state constitutions mean, 
modern state courts have tended to hew to the Supreme Court’s 
(cautious) understandings of analogous provisions in the federal 
Constitution. While the trend is not entirely in one direction, 
“systematic studies demonstrate that most state courts, when 
presented with the opportunity, have chosen not to depart from 
federal precedents when interpreting the rights-granting 
provisions of state constitutions.”39 As a result, today, “the 
practice of interpreting state constitutional provisions to have the 
same meaning as—in lockstep with—parallel provisions of the 
U.S. Constitution remains the norm.”40 Reasons for this 
phenomenon may include that state courts spend so much energy 
adhering closely to Supreme Court precedent when resolving 
federal constitutional issues that they have lost capacity for 
independent analysis that could be brought to state constitutional 
questions; litigants tend to press claims in terms of federal rather 
than state rights; judges and their staff members are trained in 
nationally-oriented law schools that devote little attention to 
issues of state constitutions; and expansive rights rulings under 
state constitutions could provoke popular backlash, particularly 
in states where judges face reelection. Whatever the explanation, 
the federal floor has to a large degree capped the development of 
rights at the state level. 
III. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 
Good friends often go unrecognized. Rather than mourn the 
passing of William Rufus Day and Rufus Peckham or hope for a 
future Supreme Court filled with originalist jurists (pp. 141, 138, 
257), Barnett might recognize some significance to his project in 
the jurisprudence of Justices John Paul Stevens and Sonia 
Sotomayor. Each has advocated a retreat from the consolidation 
of judicial power in a way that opens the door—at least a crack—
to the liberty goals that Barnett pursues. 
 
 39. Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-
First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 338 (2002). 
 40. James A. Gardner, Justice Brennan and the Foundations of Human Rights 
Federalism, 77 OHIO ST. L. J. 355, 365 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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A. JUSTICE STEVENS AND STATE COURTS 
Justice Stevens long argued that in exercising its power to 
control its docket the Supreme Court should not review criminal 
cases in which the only alleged error is that the state court granted 
the defendant stronger protection under the federal Constitution 
than the Supreme Court’s own precedents required. Stevens first 
expressed this view in 1983 in Michigan v. Long.41 In Long, the 
Michigan Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction for 
marijuana possession, holding that a police search of the 
passenger compartment of the defendant’s vehicle violated the 
Fourth Amendment.42 When the state sought review in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the defendant argued against jurisdiction because 
the state court holding rested on an independent and adequate 
state law ground (the Michigan Constitution) which, he said, 
afforded stronger protections from searches and seizures than did 
the Fourth Amendment itself.43 In her opinion for the Court, 
Justice O’Connor held that jurisdiction was proper because 
although the Michigan Supreme Court had referred in two places 
to the state constitution, it had otherwise “relied exclusively on 
federal law.”44 Justice O’Connor held that for the Supreme Court 
to deny jurisdiction in such circumstances, the state court was 
required to make clear in its opinion its independent reliance 
upon state law: absent a plain statement of reliance upon state 
law, the Court would presume jurisdiction to review the state 
court decision.45 On the merits, O’Connor held that the Michigan 
court had erred and that the search of the defendant’s vehicle was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.46 
Writing in dissent in Long, Stevens thought several factors 
combined to counsel against the Court exercising jurisdiction to 
hear the case: the Court’s traditional presumption that when a 
state court invokes state law it is an independent basis for the state 
court’s decision; respect for state courts; and the scarceness of 
federal judicial resources.47 Justice Stevens reasoned that the 
Supreme Court should allow “other decisional bodies to have the 
 
 41. Mich. v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 42. Id. at 1035–37. 
 43. Id. at 1037–38. 
 44. Id. at 1037. 
 45. Id. at 1040–41. 
 46. Id. at 1051. 
 47. Id. at 1066–67 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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last word in legal interpretation until it is truly necessary for th[e] 
Court to intervene.”48 He contended that there was no need even 
for the Supreme Court to concern itself with “cases in which a 
state court has upheld a citizen’s assertion of a right . . . under both 
federal and state law” and a state officer complains that “the state 
court interpreted federal rights too broadly and ‘overprotected’ 
the citizen.”49 Instead, Stevens urged, when it came to reviewing 
decisions of state courts, “the primary role of this Court is to make 
sure that persons who seek to vindicate federal rights have been 
fairly heard.”50 In sum, it was no business of the Supreme Court 
that a state court had adopted a more expansive view of federal 
constitutional rights in a criminal case. 
On the same day as Long, Justice O’Connor also wrote for 
the Court in California v. Ramos.51 Ramos reversed a decision of 
the California Supreme Court that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibited instructing a capital sentencing jury that it could take 
into account the governor’s power to commute a life sentence.52 
Dissenting, Justice Stevens again argued that review of the state 
court decision was unwarranted because, while based on the 
federal Constitution, it had no impact on any other state.53 Stevens 
complained that “[n]othing more than an interest in facilitating 
the imposition of the death penalty in California justified this 
Court’s exercise of its discretion to review the judgment of the 
California Supreme Court.”54 Application of the Eighth 
Amendment in a way that favored the defendant was, in Stevens’s 
view, “plainly a matter that is best left to the States.”55 
Although Justice Stevens’s dissents in Long and Ramos did 
not attract a single other vote, he did not forsake the cause. In 
particular, in three cases decided during the Court’s 2005 term, 
Stevens again argued that the Supreme Court should stay its hand 
when all that a state court had done was over-protected a federal 
right in a criminal case.56 For example, Kansas v. Marsh involved 
 
 48. Id. at 1067. 
 49. Id. at 1068. 
 50. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 51. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983). 
 52. Id. at 1002–10. 
 53. Id. at 1031 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006); 
Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006). 
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a defendant convicted in state court of capital murder and 
sentenced to death.57 On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court held 
the state’s capital sentencing statute—which required the death 
penalty if the jury found there were aggravating circumstances 
that were not outweighed by mitigating circumstances, i.e. if 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances were in equipoise—
violated the Eighth Amendment.58 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Thomas first found jurisdiction proper because the state court 
decision was not based on an adequate and independent state law 
ground.59 On the merits, the Court reversed the state court: it held 
that the Kansas statute was indistinguishable from the statute the 
Court previously upheld in Walton v. Arizona60 and it was also 
valid under other Supreme Court precedent.61 
In his dissent in Marsh, Justice Stevens argued that even if 
Walton governed (he thought not), the grant of certiorari was “a 
misuse of [the Court’s] discretion.”62 In Walton, Stevens observed, 
the petitioner was a convicted capital defendant: the Court’s task 
in that case was thus to “to consider whether the Arizona 
Supreme Court had adequately protected his rights under the 
Federal Constitution.”63 Here, by contrast, the petitioner was the 
State of Kansas asking the Court to “review a ruling of its own 
Supreme Court on the grounds that the Kansas court had granted 
more protection to a Kansas litigant than the Federal Constitution 
required.”64 Under those circumstances, Stevens contended, there 
was no reason for the Court even to hear the case. Rather, “[a] 
policy of judicial restraint would allow the highest court of the 
State to be the final decisionmaker in a case of this kind,” thereby 
promoting federalism interests.65 
Stevens’s renewed push for decentralizing judicial power 
provoked a response. Justice Scalia, who joined Justice Thomas’s 
majority opinion in Marsh, wrote a separate concurrence in which 
 
 57. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 166. 
 58. Id. at 167. 
 59. Id. at 169. 
 60. Id. at 169–73 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655-56 (1990) (upholding 
statute requiring judge to impose death penalty upon finding aggravating factors if there 
were no mitigating factors sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency)). 
 61. Id. at 173–79. 
 62. Id. at 199 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 200. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 200–01. 
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he disputed Justice Stevens’s view that—as Justice Scalia 
described it—”[w]hen a criminal defendant loses a questionable 
constitutional point, we may grant review; when the State loses, 
we must deny it.”66 Justice Scalia rejected Stevens’s claim that the 
Court had no interest in hearing the case: “Our principal 
responsibility . . . and a primary basis for the Constitution’s 
allowing us to be accorded jurisdiction to review state-court 
decisions . . . is to ensure the integrity and uniformity of federal 
law.”67 Allowing state courts to apply federal constitutional rights 
in criminal cases more generously, Scalia argued, would “change 
the uniform ‘law of the land’ into a crazy quilt.”68 Scalia also 
argued that Stevens’s approach was based “on a misguided view 
of federalism.”69 
B. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR AND RIGHTS DIVERSITY 
In 2009, during her first term on the Supreme Court, Justice 
Sotomayor joined Stevens’s dissent in Michigan v. Fisher in which 
he again called for the Court to decline review where a state court 
had given enhanced federal protections to criminal defendants.70 
In Fisher, police officers responding to a disturbance entered the 
defendant’s home without a warrant after they saw him inside the 
home screaming, throwing things, and bleeding.71 At the 
defendant’s trial for assault, the state court held that the Fourth 
Amendment rendered the evidence the police obtained from the 
home (including a gun) inadmissible.72 The intermediate state 
appellate court affirmed and the Michigan Supreme Court denied 
review.73 In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that under the emergency aid exception to the Fourth 
 
 66. Id. at 185 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 67. Id. at 183. 
 68. Id. at 185. 
 69. Id. at 184. Scalia wrote: 
When state courts erroneously invalidate actions taken by the people of a State 
(through initiative or through normal operation of the political branches of their 
state government) on state-law grounds, it is generally none of our business; and 
our displacing of those judgments would indeed be an intrusion upon state 
autonomy. But when state courts erroneously invalidate such actions because 
they believe federal law requires it—and especially when they do so because they 
believe the Federal Constitution requires it—review by this Court, far from 
undermining state autonomy, is the only possible way to vindicate it. Id. 
(emphasis omitted). 
 70. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 50–51 (2009) (per curiam). 
 71. Id. at 45–46 
 72. Id. at 46. 
 73. Id. 
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Amendment recognized by Brigham City v. Stuart74 the 
warrantless entry into the home was permissible.75 According to 
the decision, “[a] straightforward application of the emergency 
aid exception, as in Brigham City, dictates that the officer’s entry 
was reasonable.”76 Stevens criticized the majority for reviewing 
the case and “micromanaging the day-to-day business of state 
tribunals making fact-intensive decisions of this kind.”77 
While Sotomayor joined Stevens in Fisher, she did not join a 
similar dissent he wrote that same term in Florida v. Powell78 and 
thus the extent to which she embraced the Stevens approach to 
the Court’s role vis-à-vis state courts was not clear. With Stevens’s 
retirement at the end of that term, it seemed perhaps that no 
member of the Court thought state courts could have leeway to 
over-protect federal constitutional rights. 
In the Court’s 2015 term, however, Justice Sotomayor 
embraced the Stevens approach with new vigor. In Kansas v. 
Carr,79 a Kansas jury had sentenced three defendants to death but 
the Kansas Supreme Court vacated the death sentences, holding 
that the sentencing instructions violated the Eighth Amendment 
in failing “to affirmatively inform the jury that mitigating 
 
 74. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006). 
 75. Fisher, 558 U.S. at 47–48. 
 76. Id. at 48. 
 77. Id. at 51–52 (Stevens, J., with Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Stevens had also thought 
in Brigham City that the Court should not have granted review to correct a state court 
decision over-protecting the defendant; he called the case “an odd flyspeck.” Brigham City, 
547 U.S. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 78. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (2010). In Powell, police gave the defendant a 
Miranda warning that included the statements “You have the right to talk to a lawyer 
before answering any of our questions” and “You have the right to use any of these rights 
at any time you want during this interview” but did not specifically advise the defendant 
he had the right to have a lawyer present during questioning. Id. at 53–54. The Florida 
Supreme Court held that the warning was defective under Miranda and that the 
defendant’s statement (admitting he owned a gun) had to be suppressed. Id. at 54. In an 
opinion by Justice Ginsburg the Supreme Court reversed, holding 7-2 that the warning was 
adequate. Id. at 56. Justice Stevens dissented. Id. at 65 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Criticizing 
(once more) the standard of Michigan v. Long, Stevens contended that the Court should 
not have heard the case at all because the Florida decision rested on an independent and 
adequate state law ground and he predicted that the state court would simply reinstate its 
prior ruling under the state constitution. Id. On the merits of the federal issue, Stevens 
argued that the Court should not have intervened when reasonable judges can disagree 
about whether specific language satisfies Miranda and “the judges of the highest court of 
the State have decided [a specific Miranda] warning is insufficiently protective of the rights 
of the State’s citizens.” Id. at 76. Breyer, also in dissent, did not join this portion of 
Stevens’s opinion.  
 79. Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016). 
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circumstances need only be proved to the satisfaction of the 
individual juror in that juror’s sentencing decision and not beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”80 Without such an instruction, the state 
supreme court reasoned, the jurors might have labored under an 
erroneous standard and excluded relevant mitigating evidence.81 
In an 8-1 decision with an opinion by Justice Scalia the Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the Eighth Amendment, as 
construed by the Court in prior capital cases, imposes no 
requirement to instruct a jury that mitigating circumstances need 
not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.82 Further, Scalia held, 
even if it were unconstitutional to require the defense to prove 
mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt the record 
did not support the defendants’ claim in the case that the jurors 
had actually applied that standard in imposing the death penalty.83 
Justice Sotomayor dissented. She wrote: “I do not believe 
these cases should ever have been reviewed by the Supreme 
Court.”84 She explained that she saw “no reason to intervene in 
cases like these—and plenty of reasons not to” intervene in 
instances where a state has “not violated any federal 
constitutional right” and merely “overprotected its citizens based 
on its interpretation of state and federal law.”85 Reviewing those 
sorts of cases, Sotomayor reasoned, “prevent[s] States from 
serving as necessary laboratories for experimenting with how best 
to guarantee defendants a fair trial.86 Sotomayor would thus have 
dismissed the writs as improvidently granted.87 
Invoking Stevens’s own earlier arguments, Sotomayor 
identified several costs to the Supreme Court reviewing cases 
where a state court had afforded criminal defendants more 
 
 80. Id. at 640. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 643. 
 83. Id. at 643–44. 
 84. Id. at 646 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. Sotomayor emphasized the significance of a state law issue in the case that 
underlay the federal claim. See id. at 647 (“[t]he instructions did not state that, under 
Kansas’ statutory scheme, mitigating circumstances need only be proven to an individual 
juror’s satisfaction and not beyond a reasonable doubt”); id. (“[t]he court found that the 
instructions therefore both undermined Kansas’ state law and created a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury . . . applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents 
consideration of mitigating evidence as required by the Federal Constitution”) (omission 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 87. Id. at 646. 
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generous protection of federal constitutional rights. First, “[w]e 
risk issuing opinions that, while not strictly advisory, may have 
little effect if a lower court is able to reinstate its holding as a 
matter of state law.”88 Second, “[w]e expend resources on cases 
where the only concern is that a State has ‘overprotected’ its 
citizens.”89 Third, “[w]e intervene in an intrastate dispute between 
the State’s executive and its judiciary rather than entrusting the 
State’s structure of government to sort it out.”90 Fourth, “we lose 
valuable data about the best methods of protecting constitutional 
rights—a particular concern in cases like these, where the federal 
constitutional question turns on the ‘reasonable likelihood’ of jury 
confusion, an empirical question best answered with evidence 
from many state courts.”91 
In addition, Sotomayor argued, review where the only error 
was overprotecting rights has the effect of diminishing rights. “In 
explaining that the Federal Constitution does not protect some 
particular right,” she wrote, “it is natural to buttress the 
conclusion by explaining why that right is not very important.”92 
Such explanations from the Supreme Court, Sotomayor argued, 
“risk[] discouraging States from adopting valuable procedural 
protections even as a matter of their own state law.”93 The result, 
she wrote, is to undermine “[s]tate experimentation with how best 
to guarantee a fair trial to criminal defendants,”94 which serves as 
“an essential aspect of our federalism scheme.”95 Sotomayor 
explained that in holding that the Eighth Amendment does not 
require an instruction that mitigating factors need not be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the majority “uses this Court’s 
considerable influence to call into question the logic of specifying 
any burden of proof as to mitigating circumstances”96 and thus 
“denigrates the many States that do specify a burden of proof for 
the existence of mitigating factors as a matter of state law.”97 
Weighing in unnecessarily, she cautioned, imposes “unexpected 
 
 88. Id. at 647. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 648. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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costs by disrupting . . . state experimentation.”98 In other words, 
intervention on the federal issue shapes also how state law itself 
will develop. “Though the Court pretends that it sends back cases 
like this one with a clean slate,” Sotomayor wrote, “it rarely fully 
erases its thoughts on the virtues of the procedural protection at 
issue. By placing a thumb on the scale against a State adopting—
even as a matter of state law—procedural protections the 
Constitution does not require, the Court risks turning the Federal 
Constitution into a ceiling, rather than a floor, for the protection 
of individual liberties.”99 
Perhaps most intriguingly, Sotomayor also warned in Carr of 
the risks associated with the Supreme Court issuing constitutional 
decisions in cases that may be unrepresentative. Noting the 
severity of the defendants’ crimes in the case, she said that “the 
majority is understandably anxious to ensure they receive their 
just deserts” but that she did not “believe that interest justifies not 
only ‘correcting’ the Kansas Supreme Court’s error but also 
calling into question the procedures of other States.”100 She 
concluded: “The standard adage teaches that hard cases make bad 
law. . . . I fear that these cases suggest a corollary: Shocking cases 
make too much law.”101 
Referencing his own prior responses to Justice Stevens, 
Justice Scalia disagreed with Sotomayor’s position. He wrote: 
It generally would have been ‘none of our business’ had the 
Kansas Supreme Court vacated . . . [the] death sentences on 
state-law grounds. But it decidedly did not. And when the 
Kansas Supreme Court time and again invalidates death 
sentences because it says the Federal Constitution requires it, 
review by this Court, far from undermining state autonomy, is 
the only possible way to vindicate it.102 
 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 649. Nonetheless, Sotomayor did not suggest review is never warranted 
when rights have been over-protected:  
There may, of course, be rare cases where certiorari is warranted in which a state 
prosecutor alleges that a State’s highest court has overprotected a criminal 
defendant. These circumstances may include: Where a state court’s decision in 
favor of a criminal defendant implicates another constitutional right . . . ; where 
a state court indicates a hostility to applying federal precedents . . . ; or where a 
state court’s grant of relief is particularly likely to destabilize or significantly 
interfere with federal policy. Id. at 651.  
 100. Id. at 651. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 641 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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In Scalia’s view, “[t]he state courts may experiment all they 
want with their own constitutions, and often do in the wake of this 
Court’s decisions. . . . But what a state court cannot do is 
experiment with our Federal Constitution and expect to elude this 
Court’s review so long as victory goes to the criminal 
defendant.”103 Besides the problem of federal constitutional law 
becoming a “crazy quilt,”104 denying review “would enable state 
courts to blame the unpopular death-sentence reprieve of the 
most horrible criminals upon the Federal Constitution when it is 
in fact their own doing.”105 
The Stevens/Sotomayor approach would seem to serve 
Barnett’s purposes more reliably than our present-day uniform 
approach to federal constitutional rights. Wide-ranging liberty 
claims and demands for a judicial check on the rationality of 
legislation would fare better in a system in which courts could 
limit the reach of decisions. Immunity from Supreme Court 
review would provide that sort of opportunity. 
C. MCDONALD, REVISITED 
When considered in light of Michigan v. Long and Kansas v. 
Marsh (and similar cases), Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in 
McDonald v. Chicago might also hold more promise for Barnett’s 
approach than did the majority opinion in that case. In McDonald, 
Stevens argued that the question was “not whether the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms . . . applies to the 
States”106 but rather “whether the particular right asserted by 
petitioners applies to the States because of the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself, standing on its own bottom.”107 In other words, 
because (according to Stevens) the Second Amendment only 
constrains the federal government, the question was whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Liberty Clause (which does constrain 
the states) itself includes an individual right to keep arms. 
Incorporation was, therefore, a “misnomer.”108 And Heller, which 
involved only the meaning of the Second Amendment, “sheds no 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 642. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 561 U.S. 743, 883 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. Stevens construed the petitioners’ claim as about the right to keep a handgun 
in the home, i.e. not necessarily tied to self-defense, but this aspect of his opinion is not 
important for present purposes. 
 108. Id. at 864. 
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light”109 on whether there is a parallel right held against state 
government under the Fourteenth Amendment. “Inclusion in the 
Bill of Rights,” Stevens wrote, “is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for an interest to be judicially enforceable under the Fourteenth 
Amendment” against the states.110 
Further, Stevens argued, because the Liberty Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment uniquely applies to the states, the scope 
of a right can apply differently to the states than it applies to the 
federal government (to which the Bill of Rights applies 
directly).111 Stevens explained: “The rights protected against state 
infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause need not be identical in shape or scope to the rights 
protected against Federal Government infringement by the 
various provisions of the Bill of Rights.”112 While, Stevens noted, 
the Supreme Court has applied fully some (but not all) provisions 
of the Bill of Rights against the states, “elementary considerations 
of constitutional text and structure suggest there may be 
legitimate reasons to hold state governments to different 
standards than the Federal Government in certain areas.”113 Thus, 
he wrote, “the ‘incorporation’ of a provision of the Bill of Rights 
into the Fourteenth Amendment does not, in itself, mean the 
provision must have precisely the same meaning in both 
contexts.”114 
Stevens thought there are good reasons not to hold the states 
to the same standard of rights that constrain the federal 
government. Variation in how rights apply, he argued, can 
produce federalism benefits of experimentation.115 Uniformity, by 
contrast, undermines the possibility of tailoring rights to local 
conditions.116 In addition, he contended, insisting on uniformity in 
rights leads to a watered-down version of rights—one that is 
palatable to all jurisdictions.117 This did not mean that congruence 
between how rights apply to the federal government and the 
 
 109. Id. at 861. 
 110. Id. at 866. 
 111. Id. at 866–67. 
 112. Id. at 866. 
 113. Id. at 867. 
 114. Id. at 868. In making this point, Stevens drew upon the view of Justice Harlan in 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), and other cases. Id. 
 115. Id. at 869. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 870. 
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states is never warranted. Stevens noted that under the Court’s 
precedents most criminal procedural protections of the Bill of 
Rights apply in the same way in state and federal court so as to 
“ensure a criminal trial satisfies essential standards of fairness.”118 
He explained that this made sense because “[t]he need for 
certainty and uniformity is more pressing, and the margin for 
error slimmer, when criminal justice is at issue.”119 (In light of his 
position, in Michigan v. Long and subsequent cases, that the 
Supreme Court should not intervene to correct state courts that 
over-protect the federal rights of state criminal defendants, by 
“uniformity” Stevens must mean here a common baseline of 
protection below which no court can drop.) Stevens therefore 
thought the cases cited by Justice Alito in his opinion for the 
Court in McDonald that seemingly rejected any variation 
between how a provision of the Bill of Rights applies to the 
federal government and the states had to be understood in the 
special context of criminal justice.120 
According to Stevens, the right to keep and bear arms does 
not require uniform application to the federal government and 
the states.121 Based on a textual and historical argument, Stevens 
concluded that the right the petitioners claimed in McDonald did 
not fall within the scope of “liberty” the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects.122 But even if it did, he argued, the Court should not so 
hold. Stevens contended that given wide variations in crime rates 
and demographics, “this is a quintessential area in which 
federalism ought to be allowed to flourish without this Court’s 
meddling.”123 In his view, the Court should decline to apply the 
rule of Heller to the states because the Court lacks the “technical 
capacity and . . . localized expertise” to determine the proper 
 
 118. Id. at 868.  
 119. Id. Elsewhere in his opinion, Stevens refers to “matter[s] not critical to personal 
liberty or procedural justice,” rights like “the ability independently to define one’s 
identity” that lie at the “conceptual core” of the Liberty Clause, and the interests of 
politically powerless groups. Id. at 869, 879. It is not clear whether Stevens’s point was that 
there should be no variation with respect to these rights also. 
 120. Id. at 869. 
 121. Id. at 883–84 (“Even accepting the Court’s holding in Heller, it remains entirely 
possible that the right to keep and bear arms identified in that opinion is not judicially 
enforceable against the States, or that only part of the right is so enforceable. It is likewise 
possible for the Court to find in this case that some part of the Heller right applies to the 
States, and then to find in later cases that other parts of the right also apply, or apply on 
different terms.”). 
 122. Id. at 890. 
 123. Id. at 902. 
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scope of gun regulation (and therefore the scope of the 
corresponding right).124 States and localities, he argued, are in a 
much better position to set the proper contours in this area and 
they should be allowed to do so provided that “the regulatory 
measures they have chosen are not arbitrary, capricious, or 
unreasonable.”125 In other words, the right recognized in Heller 
could and should “apply on different terms” to the states 
compared to the federal government.126 
In his McDonald opinion, Justice Alito rejected Stevens’s 
“special incorporation test applicable only to the Second 
Amendment.”127 In Alito’s view, a “two-track approach”128 by 
which “in order to respect federalism and allow useful state 
experimentation”129 the Second Amendment “should not be fully 
binding on the States”130 was inconsistent with the Court’s 
interpretations of the Bill of Rights and with the fact that the Bill 
limits the ability of states and localities to experiment.131 
Justice Scalia also wrote a concurring opinion in McDonald 
in which he criticized Stevens for (among other things) his 
willingness to treat the Second Amendment as different from 
other provisions of the Bill of Rights.132 In Scalia’s view, Stevens’s 
proposed Liberty Clause analysis would put too much discretion 
in the hands of judges. “Deciding what is essential to an 
enlightened, liberty-filled life is an inherently political, moral 
judgment—the antithesis of an objective approach that reaches 
conclusions by applying neutral rules to verifiable evidence.”133 
Scalia complained also that under Stevens’s approach, “whatever 
the Constitution . . . may say, the list of protected rights will be 
whatever courts wish it to be.”134 Stevens’s call for localized 
experimentation was thus just a smoke-screen for enhancing 
judicial power: “The implication of Justice Stevens’s call for 
abstention is that if We The Court conclude that They The 
 
 124. Id. at 903. 
 125. Id. at 902 (internal quotations omitted). 
 126. Id. at 884. 
 127. Id. at 784. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 784–85. 
 132. Id. at 791–92 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 133. Id. at 800. 
 134. Id. at 805. 
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People’s answers to a problem are silly, we are free to ‘intervene’ 
. . . but if we too are uncertain of the right answer, or merely think 
the States may be onto something, we can loosen the leash.”135 
A different image emerges, however, if we read Stevens’s 
dissent in McDonald in light of his dissenting opinions in Long 
and Marsh and other cases advocating that the Court stay its hand 
when state courts have over-protected the rights of criminal 
defendants. Stevens made no mention of Long or Marsh in 
McDonald. But in all three cases, Stevens’s dissents rest on similar 
ideas: Provisions of the Bill of Rights need not apply in the same 
way everywhere. So long as states do not drop below a national 
floor, they can pursue different approaches. Variation can be a 
good thing because it produces the federalism benefit of 
experimentation.136 
The specific sort of variation Stevens had in mind in Long 
and Marsh is, of course, distinct from that in McDonald because 
the starting points in the two contexts differ. In Long and Marsh, 
state government and the federal government begin equally 
constrained by the Bill of Rights as the Supreme Court 
understands it; a state court can apply more stringent rules against 
state government in state criminal proceedings than apply in 
federal court. In McDonald, state government is less constrained 
by the Second Amendment than is the federal government under 
the Court’s precedents. Nonetheless, in each context Stevens is in 
favor of variable application of Bill of Rights provisions. 
Reading Steven’s dissent in McDonald through the lens of 
Long and Marsh also suggests the possibility that state courts 
could apply stronger Second Amendment protections against 
state government than the Supreme Court itself imposes. As in 
the criminal procedural context of Long and Marsh, state court 
decisions could raise the level of Second Amendment rights 
against the states above what the Supreme Court requires. 
Indeed, state court generosity could result in state governments 
 
 135. Id. at 803 (alteration in original). 
 136. See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he 
Constitution establishes a federal republic where local differences are cherished as 
elements of liberty, rather than eliminated in a search for national uniformity. McDonald 
circumscribes the scope of permissible experimentation by state and local governments, 
but it does not foreclose all possibility of experimentation. Within the limits established by 
the Justices in Heller and McDonald, federalism and diversity still have a claim.”) 
(rejecting Second Amendment challenge to local ban on possession of assault weapons and 
large-capacity magazines), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015). 
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actually being more constrained than is the federal government 
under whatever post-Heller case law the Court develops. 
Nonetheless, we do not know whether Stevens himself 
thought it desirable to apply his approach in Long and Marsh 
beyond the context of criminal cases so as to allow state courts to 
construe the Second Amendment more broadly against state 
government.137 One reason for thinking Stevens might have been 
inclined to apply his approach in Long and Marsh beyond 
criminal procedural rights is that Stevens’s very notion of 
federalism includes the possibility of differences between federal 
and state judges on issues of federal constitutional law. 
Throughout his dissent in McDonald, Stevens presents his 
concern as centered on federal courts. Stevens complains, for 
example, of “federal courts’ imposing a uniform national 
standard,”138 and of “a federal court insist[ing] that state and local 
authorities follow its dictates.”139 Further, in urging his colleagues 
to exercise restraint, he writes: “it is more in keeping . . . with our 
status as a court in a federal system . . . to avoid imposing a single 
solution . . . from the top down.”140 In criticizing Stevens’s position 
in McDonald as aggrandizing judicial power, Alito and Scalia 
refer generally to “courts” and “judges.” They do not recognize 
Stevens’s particular focus on delineating the proper role of the 
federal courts (including the Supreme Court) in the federal 
system. Accordingly, they misconstrue Stevens’s analysis as based 
on a framework invented just for gun rights and thus miss much 
of the richness of Stevens’s federalism argument—and its 
implications for rights. 
Even if Barnett thinks Stevens reached the wrong conclusion 
in McDonald, there is much in Stevens’s dissent that could be 
useful to Barnett’s overall project. Like Barnett, Stevens 
emphasizes “liberty” and “due process” as the key concerns in 
adjudicating rights, along with a judicial role in reviewing laws for 
arbitrariness. More significantly, accepting that federal 
 
 137. One issue in this regard is that state government prosecutes state defendants only 
in state court. Second Amendment cases against a state can be brought in either state or 
federal court. Extending Stevens’s approach in Marsh to the Second Amendment 
therefore raises the possibility that a state court would invalidate a state law that a federal 
court has held constitutional. 
 138. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 869 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. at 902–03 (first and third omission in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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constitutional rights can properly vary from one location to the 
next opens the door to the possibility of more robust federal rights 
than those that emerge when, as now, the Supreme Court sets 
both floors and ceilings. 
CONCLUSION: OUR CONSTITUTION 
Consolidated judicial power poses a significant barrier to 
Randy Barnett’s efforts to restore a “Republican Constitution” of 
the form he describes. The path forward for Barnett’s project is 
far from obvious. Some success might result from developing 
existing tools, including those (like the Stevens/Sotomayor 
approach to state courts) found in unexpected places. 
Nonetheless, securing the very broad scope of individual 
sovereignty Barnett advocates would likely require a basic 
restructuring of the judicial system. For example, development of 
robust individualized rights might require shutting off entirely 
appellate review of judicial decisions that invoke the Constitution 
to invalidate statutes or executive actions. Likewise, 
commitments to precedent and stare decisis might need to be 
abandoned so that litigants seeking to vindicate their own rights 
are not boxed in by stingy rulings of the past. Perhaps, too, only 
the party to a case would benefit from a favorable rights-based 
ruling so that courts are incentivized to protect liberty vigorously 
without fear of unanticipated consequences. Changes like these, 
however, would entail a far more radical overhaul of the judicial 
system than Barnett himself envisages. Such reforms would also 
surely exceed the capacities of the existing constitutional 
arrangements. Success, if it were to come, would thus mean a 
Constitution that serves Me the People but that—whether 
deemed Republican, Democratic, or something else—would not 
be Our Constitution as we know it. 
 
